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COMMENT ON RECENT CASES
tion company which was afterwards active in the operation of the
railway company, but there was no evidence that King knew this
fact. The railway company issued a large amount of debenture
notes; the road was constructed and operated for a few years, when
all its property was assigned to another street railway company, and
the B. & D. Company ceased to do business, owing large sums of
money to creditors, among whom were the plaintiffs in this action.
The effort to recover from King was based chiefly upon the con-
tention that the rights and liabilities resulting from the subscription
by King were not assignable, that there was no novation, and that
in any event, the assignment was in fraud of the company's cred-
itors.
The court held that, by the subscription and the acceptance of
it by the corporation, King acquired certain rights and incurred
certain liabilities; that the rights acquired by him under the sub-
scription were assignable; and that when the company accepted S.
as the successor to King's rights and liabilities, there was a complete
novation, which operated to release King, unless the transaction
could be impeached as one in fraud of creditors. Upon the latter
question, it was pointed out that there were no creditors at the
time of the transaction, and the findings expressly disclaimed any in-
tention on the part of King to defraud future creditors.
The making of the subscription and its acceptance by the cor-
poration ordinarily completely establish the rights and liabilities of
the subscriber, even though no call has yet been made for payment,
and no certificate of stock has yet been issued. There seems to be
no reason why these rights and liabilities should not be transferred
at this stage as completely as they may be after certificates of stock
have been issued, and to this effect are the authorities.
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FLOYD R. MECHEM.
EVIDENCE- ADMuISSIONS - CONSPIRATOS.-[Iowa], M and F
were jointly tried and convicted on a charge of conspiracy to com-
mit the crime of adultery. Each of the defendants had made sep-
arate incriminating admissions which were proved at the trial over
the objection of each to the admissions of the other. Held, that
such admissions were properly received, though the admissions of
one could not be considered as evidence against, the other. State v.
Martin.'
In the ordinary case of co-defendants on a joint trial, where
one may be convicted and the other acquitted, the rule is well set-
tled that an admission or confession is admissible against the defend-
ant who made it, but not against the other, and the jury should be
cautioned not to consider it as evidence of the guilt of the latter.2
2. See Valentine v. Water Power Co. (1901) 128 Mich. 280, 87 N. W.
370; Roosevelt v. Hanzblin (1908), 199 Mass. 127, 85 N. E. 98, 18 L. R. A.
(N. s.) 748.
1. (1924) 200 N. W. (Ia.) 213.
2. (1895) Sparf v. U. S. 156 U. S. 51.
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In the case of an indictment of two defendants for conspiring
with each other, or for any other strictly joint offense requiring the
participating of both, it is generally held that if one is acquitted,
both must be acquitted. 3
It might be supposed therefor, that the issue is single in such a
case, and hence that no evidence could be received unless it was
admissible against both defendants. Such a rule has generally been
applied in will contest cases to exclude admissions by a legatee or
devisee because not competent against the other parties, and the
issue could not be separated.4
Professor Wigmore has criticized the rule in the will cases as
unduly technical and not a necessary result from the fact that the
issue is single.5
But a jury could hardly be expected to deal with the one ques-
tion of testamentary capacity, from the different angles involved in
considering various items of evidence, good against a particular
legatee, but not against the others. The inevitable difficulties and
confusion from such an attempt seem to furnish a sufficient justifica-
tion for the accepted rule in the will cases. The single question in a
will contest differs from the question involved where two persons
are charged with co-operating, because the co-operation is the result
of the acts of each. A and B are charged in a civil case as joint
promissors; the joint promise is the result of the signing by each
of a written instrument. A and B are charged with conspiring with
each other. The conspiracy results from the words and acts of
each. Hence in such cases it is not only possible, but frequently
necessary, to prove the acts of each by different items of evidence.
Where A and B are charged with conspiring with each other, it
may be logically impossible for A to be guilty and B innocent, but
there is no inconsistency in recognizing that evidence, which is
admissible against A alone, may prove the guilt of both so far as
he is concerned, though the hearsay rule may prevent its considera-
tion for the purpose of convicting B. This has frequently been
recognized where the technical rule requiring the acquittal of both
in case of a failure of proof as to,one was not applied. For example,
in a suit for divorce, where the principal defendant and the co-
respondent were charged with adultery.6
And even on an indictment of two for adultery, where the only
proof of the marriage of the woman was her own admission, and
both were found guilty, the Supreme Court of Massachusetts sus-
tained the exceptions of the male defendant and allowed the con-
viction of the woman to stand.7
3. (1846) State v. Mainor 6 Fed. 340; (1883) Reg. v. Manning 12Q. B. D. 241; (1919) Feder v. U. S. 257 Fed. 694.
4. (1825) Nuisear v. Arnold, 13 S. & R. 323; (1868) Shailer v. Bum-
stead 99 Mass. 112; (1900) Shierbaum v. Schemne 157 Mo. 1; (1912) James
v. Fairall 154 Ia. 253; (1920) Joyal v. Pilotte 293 Ill. 377.
5. Wigmore, Evidence, 2 Ed. Sec. 1081 (2). '
6. (1858) Robinson v. Robinson 1 S. W. and Tr. 362.
7. (1868) Commonwealth v. Thompson 99 Mass. 444.
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The technical requirement that both be .acquitted if either is
acquitted does not affect the possibility of considering the evidence
against each separately, as would be the case on separate trials.
Hence it appears sufficient if each is found guilty on evidence prov-
ing the whole issue ag-ainst him.8
E. W. HINTON.
HUSBAND AND WIFE-SUITS BY ONE AGAINST THE OTHER.-
In Plotkin v. Plotkin' [Delaware] a husband joined his wife in a
replevin suit, under a statute which provided:
"That the property of a married woman, whether real, personal or
mixed, and choses in action which she may have acquired in any man-
ner, and all the income, rents and profits thereof, should be deemed to
be her sole and separate property, and she may sell, convey, assign,
transfer, devise, bequeath, encumber or otherwise dispose of the same,
and she may .contract jointly (including with her husband) or sep-
arately, sue and be sued, and exercise all other rights and powers, in-
cluding the power to make a will, which a feme sole may do under the
laws of this state."
This provision, the court held, did not expressly give power to
husband and wife to sue each other; and, because "the right to sue
each other strikes at the very heart of domestic relations, and its
effect not only upon home ties but upon society generally would be
far-reaching,." the court refused to extend the operation of the pro-
vision, by implication.
It should be observed that the litigation here in question was
not one in tort, and while it might be said to be one involving the
separate property of the wife, it was not one designed to protect
her in the enjoyment of that property, for the husband brought the
suit.
The present day married women's legislation in- Illinois pro-
vides:
"A married woman may own, in her own right, real and personal
property obtained by descent, gift or purchase, and manage, sell and
convey the same to the same extent and in the same manner that the
husband can property belonging to him "
And by another section-
"may in all cases, sue and be sued without joining heK husband with
her, to the same extent as if she were unmarried, and an attachment
or judgment may be enforced by or against her as if she were a single
woman."
And by still another section-
"Should either the husband or wife unlawfully obtain or retain posses-
8. (1897) People v. Butler 111 Mich. 483; (1902) Commonwealth v.
Rogers 181 Mass. 184; (1914) People v. Darr 104 N. E. (Ill.) 389; (1919)
Feder v. U. S. 257 Fed. 694; (1921) State v. Neunnan 113 Atl. (N. J.) 225.
1. (1924) 125 Atl. 455.
